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mAbstract
This article examines the reasons management of the New England groundfishery
has failed, while management of the Maine lobster industry has succeeded. After
35 years of management, groundfish stock sizes and catches are lower than ever
while lobster stocks are at record high levels. We argue that the New England
groundfishing industry is caught in a prisoner's dilemma from which it has failed to
escape. That dilemma is due to the interaction of social, political and economic
variables that have lowered the benefits of investing in rules to conserve fish stocks.
The lobster industry, once marked by a piracy ethic, has been able to escape from its
dilemma and, over time, develop a strong conservation ethic and institutions. Our
evolutionary game theory model indicates that three sets of factors are involved in
this cultural transformation of the lobster industry, which has led to support for
better conservation rules and for law enforcement.Introduction
Efforts to manage marine fisheries have not been notably successful. An estimated
86.9% of the world’s marine fisheries are overexploited or fully exploited (FAO 2012)
even though many have been under scientific management for decades. In the Gulf of
Maine, one finds both success and failure. The Gulf of Maine groundfishing industry,a
once one of the most prolific in the world, is now a shadow of its former self. The
Maine lobster industry, by contrast, is currently experiencing record high lobster
catches. Since both these industries have been under scientific management for de-
cades, we are not only witnessing different levels of economic success, but differential
success of the management regimes. In this article, we compare the Gulf of Maine
groundfishing industry and its management with that of the lobster industry to dis-
cover why one management system has succeeded whereas the other has failed. We
argue that the essential difference is that the lobster fishery over the course of de-
cades has been able to evolve a strong conservation ethic (a subculture) that moti-
vates fishermen to support and enforce conservation rules; the groundfishery has
not.
Basic theoretical perspective: collective-action problems
Rational choice theory argues that people choose norms or rules to gain the benefits of
coordinated activities and joint action. Simply because norms should produce favorable
results, however, there is no guarantee they will be developed. The essential problem is2014 Acheson and Gardner; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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for the group (Taylor 1990: 223), a situation termed a “collective-action dilemma”. In
collective-action dilemmas, rational action by individuals brings disaster for larger
social units (Elster 1989).
Open-access fisheries present a collective-action dilemma. Since there are no prop-
erty rights, no one has any incentive to protect the fish stocks. Under these conditions,
it is rational for each fisherman to take all the fish he or she can as quickly as possible.
Even though a rule constraining fishing effort would result in a healthier breeding
stock, increased catches, lower prices for consumers, and a sustainable fishery, it is in
the short-run interests of fishermen to overfish. In all too many cases including the
Gulf of Maine groundfishery, fishermen do exactly that.
Many collective-action dilemmas can be modeled as prisoner’s dilemma games. These
are games in which both players have a dominant strategy to defect. But the payoffs for
both are worse than if they had played their dominated strategy to cooperate (Dixit and
Skeath 2004). From this perspective, the primary difference between these two fishing
industries is that the groundfishery has not been able to solve its prisoner’s dilemma.
The result is that groundfishermen get low payoffs even though they have acted rationally.
Lobster management has been able to overcome this obstacle.
Theoretically, the most popular way out of a prisoner’s dilemma is to let the players
play the game repeatedly forever (Axelrod 1984; Gardner 2003; Le and Boyd 2007). In
this case, if they are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Nash equilibrium supporting
high-quality conservation rules. A way that often works experimentally is to let the sub-
jects communicate with each other; they talk their way out of the dilemma.
Another solution is to generate rules making it costly to play the dominant strategy.
This is the solution that has been tried in these fisheries. It has worked in the case of
the lobster fishery and resulted in effective rules; it has not worked in the case of the
groundfishery. The question is why. To answer this question we have constructed a
model based on the idea of adaptive behavior.
Adaptive behavior describes a situation in which groups of people try different solu-
tions to solve the problems they face. When the solutions do not work, they alter their
strategies, learn from their mistakes, and gradually evolve rules that do work. This set
of concepts runs through the work of Axelrod (1984, 1986) who says, “This approach is
based on the principle that what works well for a player is more likely to be used again
while what turns out poorly is more likely to be discarded” (Axelrod 1986: 1097). A vast
literature in game theory has studied adaptive dynamics of behavior (Axelrod 1984,
1986; Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003; Le and Boyd 2007; Samuelson 2002) using the
framework of evolutionary games, and we have used this approach in framing our
model to explain the differential generation of rules in the lobster and groundfish
industries.
Methods
Data for this article were collected over the past 30 years during a number of different
studies by the senior author and colleagues. We used qualitative research techniques,
including direct observation of fishing; and open-ended interviews with officials,
scientists, and fishermen. We have also made good use of archival materials, especially
articles from Commercial Fisheries News.
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industry used in this article. In 1978, the senior author and his collaborators inter-
viewed 318 captains or owners of groundfish boats in New England to gather informa-
tion useful for implementation of the U.S. extended jurisdiction (200-mile limit). We
focused on obtaining general demographic information (age, education, work history,
fishing experience); commitment to fishing; and attitudes towards management, the
federal government, science, and support for various types of rules. In 1978, many
people were ordering new boats and gear. Thus we emphasized gear switching and
vessel changes. We were able interview 60% (184) of the Maine and New Hampshire
captains.
We conducted another study of the groundfishery in the summer of 2008 to docu-
ment the industry’s decline. This study focused on gathering information on the fishing
history of people who had been in the industry in the 1970s, and how they had reacted
to the drastic changes in management from 1976 to 2012. We contacted by phone
people who had licenses in 1970, 1975, or 1978, gathered general demographic infor-
mation, and asked questions about changes in their fishing and the reasons for those
changes and their attitudes about groundfish management. We emphasized gathering
data on entry/exit decisions. We contacted a total of 102 of the approximately 614
names on the license lists. Only seven were still groundfishing. The others had left
groundfishing for variety of reasons. Many had died or retired (see Acheson 2011). In
2008, the senior author also interviewed 21 key informants who were presently in-
volved or had been involved in groundfish management. They included 10 fishermen,
three academics, two agency directors, three employees of the Maine Department of
Marine Resources (DMR), and three who had worked for the federal government.
Twelve had been or were presently members of the New England Fishery Management
Council. Additional information was obtained from the archives of newspapers that
reported on the politics of fishery management. All of the data on the history of
groundfish management rules were obtained at this time.
Data on the lobster industry came from four different research projects by the senior
author. Two of these studies were conducted relatively recently and provide a good deal
of information used in this article. As part of a larger study on co-management, I con-
ducted a survey in 1997 to explore experiences and attitudes of lobster fishermen about
the Zone Management Law, which was being implemented at that time. I was inter-
ested in documenting fishermen’s attitudes about zone management organization, trap
limits, limited entry, and other facets of the recently passed law. I also wanted in-
formation about fishermen’s attitudes toward laws passed earlier and their ideas
about lobster management in general. In this study, questionnaires were sent by
mail to 3,600 lobster license holders in Maine, selected randomly; 1,140 responded to this
survey (see Acheson 2013).
In 2009–10 we designed a study to elicit information on the development of the
conservation ethic in the lobster fishery. We made good use of historical and archival
records, especially the “Correspondence of the Commissioner” in the Maine State
Archives and Commercial Fisheries News. We also sent questionnaires to 3,000 license
holders selected at random from the license list; 701 responded. In the spring of 2010,
the senior author conducted follow-up telephone interviews with 124 people who
responded to the 2009 survey and had agreed to being contacted. We asked about their
Acheson and Gardner Maritime Studies 2014, 13:8 Page 4 of 21
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/8attitudes toward various laws, and how their attitudes had changed over time. In 2009
the senior author also interviewed 32 key informants. Twenty-one were old fishermen
who were asked about the events of the 1920s and 1930s; the other 11 were officials
and others involved in lobster management. The 2009 lobster survey was administered
by staff of the Margaret Chase Smith Policy Center at the University of Maine.
These data were then analyzed by the senior author using SPSS. (See Acheson and
Gardner [2010] for a more complete description of the results of these studies).
History of groundfish and lobster catches
The success of lobster management and failure of groundfish management is reflected
in their historic catch figures. Groundfishing was the New World’s earliest industry. In
New England, catches reached their peak about 1860 (O’Leary 1996). Since that time,
catches have varied, but the general trend has been downward (Ackerman 1941). Now,
the entire Gulf of Maine only produces 6% of the fish that were produced in Blue Hill
Bay of Maine in the 1860s (Alexander et al. 2009). When federal management began in
1976, groundfish stocks were already at a low level. As seen in Figure 1, the downward
spiral of groundfish stocks and catches has continued throughout the period of federal
management.
The biological consensus is that overexploitation by humans is the most important
factor in the decline of the groundfishery. To be sure, water temperature, salinity, and
predation by mammals have also played a role, but they are minor compared with over-
fishing (Sinclair and Murawski 1997).
Since 1900, Maine lobster catches have varied greatly. During much of the 20th
century, catch levels averaged between 15 and 22 million pounds. There are two excep-
tions. In the 1920s and 1930s, a period we call the “lobster bust”, catches declinedFigure 1 Catches of Cod, Haddock, and Yellowtail Flounder, Maine and New England, 1950–2012
(millions of pounds). Chart created by Ann Acheson; landings information generated from www.st.nmfs.
noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/commercial-landings/annual-landings/index.
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1999 to the present, a period we call the “lobster boom”, catches have skyrocketed.
Since 2000, more than 50 million pounds of lobster have been landed annually in
Maine, almost ten times more than were caught in the early 1930s (see Figure 2).
The causes of the lobster bust and the boom are not known with certainty. Studies
suggest that three factors are involved. One is August water temperature, which con-
trols larval settlement success. Second, during the boom years there have been few
large groundfish capable of eating small lobsters, whereas in the bust years there were
many such fish. Third, is the growth of the conservation ethic, which has produced
a decline in illegal activity and strong support for effective conservation legislation
(Acheson 2003).Characteristics of the groundfishery
The New England groundfishery is quite heterogeneous. Although all 15 ground-
fish species live near the ocean bottom, they have different life cycles, occur in
different concentrations, and cannot all be harvested with the same type of gear.
Currently dragging or otter trawling, which involves dragging a large net along the
ocean floor, is the most commonly used technique, but many fish are also caught
with gill nets. Some fishermen, especially in Chatham, Massachusetts, use hook-
and-line technology. The sizes of the boats have also varied from 30 to 120 feet.
Larger boats have left the fleet, however, and the largest boats currently used are
80 feet. Smaller boats (40–60 feet) have one- or two-person crews and take only
one- or two-day trips. They generally fish within 60 miles of their home harbors.
The largest vessels used to have crews of five to ten and stay at sea for a week or
more.
Although the crews of these vessels are part of a social network, people in the net-
work do not all interact. Even though boats may fish on the same ground, it is oftenFigure 2 Maine Lobster Landings, 1880–2012. Chart created by Ann Acheson; figures from Historical
Maine Lobster Landings. Augusta, Maine: Department of Marine Resources. www.maine.gov/dmr/
commercialfishing/documents/lobster.tbl.pdf.
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ticular region do not know many fishermen from other regions (Holland et al. 2010)
(see, Wilson et al. [2013] for additional information on ties between fishermen). That
relative isolation is exacerbated by ethnic diversity (Italians in Gloucester, Massachusetts,
Portuguese in New Bedford, Massachusetts, and so-called Yankee fishermen from Maine
and New Hampshire).
There are several different lobbying groups representing fishermen in different
locations. In Rhode Island there are the Rhode Island Fisherman’s Alliance and the
Rhode Island Commercial Fisherman’s Association, which often do not agree on
policy. In Massachusetts there are the Cape Cod Fisherman’s Alliance in Chatham
and the North East Seafood Alliance in Gloucester. Portland, Maine, is home to
the Associated Fisheries of Maine, while the Maine Coast Fishermen’s Association
represents groundfishermen in Port Clyde, South Bristol, and other towns in central
coastal Maine.
Though the groundfish management plan is the same for all of New England
(discussed later), several rules apply to only certain areas or target species. Currently each
species has its own catch quota. There are fisheries in which small-mesh nets are required
(e.g., Acadian redfish). There are also habitat closures and rolling closures making fishing
illegal in certain areas on a rotating basis.
History of groundfish regulations
Throughout most of the history of the United States, fisheries were managed by the
states, which typically applied few regulations to the groundfishery. There was no
management of the offshore groundfishery in the northwest Atlantic until 1947 when
the International Commission for the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was formed.
ICNAF involved 11 countries including the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, and the
USSR, but it failed to conserve the stocks because regulations were not well enforced
(Acheson 1984).
In the 1960s, the Gulf of Maine was invaded by a large fleet of trawlers and factory ships
that quickly overexploited stocks of herring (Playfair 2003). By 1972, the groundfish stocks
in the Gulf of Maine were so depleted that the foreign fleets left (Acheson 1984).
The U.S. government began to manage the groundfisheries with the passage by
Congress of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) of 1976,
which gave the federal government authority to manage all fish species out to 200 miles
(Maine Commercial Fisheries, 1973). Under the FCMA, the United States and its terri-
tories are divided into eight coastal zones. Each zone has a regional council composed of
the heads of the state fisheries agencies, federal officials, and fishermen appointed by the
governors of the states involved. The regional councils propose management plans for
each species of fish to the Secretary of Commerce, who, with the advice of the NMFS,
rejects or accepts the plans.
Many plans have been tried in the New England goundfishery, involving virtually
every kind of management tool from quotas and gear restrictions to seasons and days-
at-sea. In addition, the U.S. Congress has updated the enabling legislation twice. Unfor-
tunately nothing seems to have worked. Groundfish stocks are in worse shape today
than when management began. In the following sections, we will cover only the most
important groundfish management plans.
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Under the FCMA, the first management plan on the most important species of ground-
fish in the Gulf of Maine (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) took effect in March
1978 (Dewar 1983). Under this plan, a catch quota was established for each species
for a three-month period, and when the quota was reached, fishing was halted. The
plan failed primarily because of industry lobbying and massive cheating by fishermen
(Acheson 1984).
Since the TMQ was not working, in 1979 the council decided to impose an interim
plan, which involved mesh-size regulations, minimum fish sizes, and closed areas on
spawning grounds (Barlow 1980; Morrison 1980). The interim plan was put into effect
in 1982 and lasted until 1986.
Development of the Atlantic demersal finfish fishery management plan
1n 1985 the radically different Atlantic Demersal Finfish Fishery Management Plan
(ADF) was proposed by the council after years of discussion with industry members.
Since the ADF plan was put into place in 1986, it has been extended by 17 amend-
ments (major changes) and 44 frameworks (minor changes). Many of the amendments
put new restrictions on fishing in response to evidence of stock failure. Each amend-
ment took years to develop and involved lengthy political battles. The most important
amendments are described in Table 1. It should be stressed that unless otherwise noted,
these plans applied to all groundfish species.
In the early years of the ADF, cuts in effort were quit moderate, but by the mid-
1990s, the cuts ordered by various amendments were quite drastic. In 1994 the Stock
Assessment Workshop reported that stocks had reached an all time low (Plante 1994).
As a result, in 1996 the New England Council put in place the draconian Amendment 7Table 1 Important groundfish amendments under the ADF
Amendment Date
passed
Management mechanism Impetus Reference
5 1993 Moratorium on new permits;
changes in mesh sizes; two
large closed areas on Georges







7 1996 Cut effort for cod, yellowtail
and haddock by reducing
total allowable catches,
setting trip limits and reducing
days at sea
Stock assessment showed a








Cut effort to bring plan into
compliance with Sustainable
Fisheries Act of 1996
Plante (1998c)
13 2003 Habitat protection; new stock
rebuilding timetables; days at







16 2010 Establish sectors (allows
groups of fishermen to get
an allocation of fish and
promulgate their own rules to
allocate it among themselves)
and annual catch limits
Widespread recognition that
Amendment 13 was not
working.
Labaree (2012)
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flounder by eighty percent from 1993 levels” (Plante 1998b). By 1998, groundfish stocks,
especially cod, had fallen still further (Plante 1998a). This resulted in a still more restrictive
management plan, Amendment 9 (Commercial Fisheries News 1999). More severe cuts in
effort came about with the advent of Amendment 13 (Plante 2002b).
Along with the amendments described in Table 1, several other forces affected
groundfish management. While the NMFS and the regional council were attempting to
limit fishing effort, the actions of U.S. loan agencies and the International Court had
the opposite effect (Acheson 1984; Apollonio and Dykstra 2008). Federal loan programs
facilitated the entry of new vessels. In 1977, 1,200 licenses were issued; then in 1979,
the number was increased to 2,191—an 83% increase (Acheson 1984). Changes in the
international boundary also increased fishing pressure. In 1984, the International Court in
The Hague drew a new international boundary between the U.S. and Canada in the Gulf of
Maine that excluded American fishermen from waters they had used for centuries, includ-
ing the Grand Banks, the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, Labrador, and even parts of the Gulf of
Maine. American vessels crowded into the in-shore waters of the Gulf of Maine, where, by
1986, they considerably reduced the stocks of groundfish (Lannin 1988).
In 1991 and again in 2002, the Conservation Law Foundation and other conservation
groups (e.g., the Massachusetts Audubon Society) sued the Secretary of Commerce
and the NMFS for “failing to prevent overfishing” (Plante 1991: 1A). The plaintiffs
won both suits, and the court ordered the council to prepare a plan to prevent
overfishing. One of these suits resulted in Amendment 5. The second resulted in
Amendment 13, the development of which was strongly influenced by it being in
the hands of a federal judge.
From 1984 to 1988, severe reductions in total catches were experienced as stocks be-
came overfished (Figure 1). The catches of many species declined 30% to 50% between
1982 and 1988 (Lannin 1988). Stocks reached their lowest point in 1994, because “the
spawning stock has collapsed” (Plante 1994: 11A). They have remained low ever since
despite all attempts by the council and NMFS to revive them. As stricter regulations
have gone into effect, fishing effort has also declined. Declining catches and more strin-
gent restrictions have produced a precipitous decline in the number of boats. In Maine
and New Hampshire, for example, the groundfish fleet declined from 343 in 1978 to 50
in 2009 (Acheson et al. 1980; Mack 2010).
Discussion
Four aspects of this history are especially important for our purposes.
First, fishermen were unhappy with the management process. Every action of the
council, the NMFS, or the Secretary of Commerce met with political agitation: heated
hearings, visits from congressmen, letters to newspapers and public officials, and a long
series of lawsuits by fishermen against officers of the NMFS or the Secretary of
Commerce (Miller and Van Maanen 1979; Plante 1996b, 1999). These pressure tactics
sometimes worked to reverse council and NMFS management decisions.
Second, the groundfishing industry is divided into a number of factions that rarely
attain consensus to promote or oppose any management measure. One group would
work for management goals that would benefit it at the expense of other types of
groundfishermen (Plante, 1998c, 1998d). Given the heterogeneity in the industry,
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Amendments 13 and 16 were especially nasty (see, Acheson and Gardner 2011).
Third, there has always been a good deal of cheating. The TMQ plan (1978–1980)
failed in great part because of massive problems with law enforcement, and widespread
cheating continues today. King and Sutinen (2010: 7) estimate that “from 12 to 24% of
the total harvest is taken illegally”.
Fourth, management plans developed slowly. Extreme bureaucratic complexity
(a “paperwork nightmare” according to Apollonio and Dykstra [2008: 73]), industry oppos-
ition and lawsuits along with jurisdictional conflict between the NMFS and the regional
council all contributed to delay. After 1992, the council’s ability to set its own timetable
was reduced by the two Conservation Law Foundation lawsuits and the reauthorizations of
the FCMA, which gave greater power to the NMFS (Plante 2002a). One NMFS scientist
said that delay permitted stocks to fall far more than they would have had stricter rules
been imposed earlier. If that is true, delay was deadly.
Characteristics of the maine lobster fishery
The lobster industry has always been an inshore trap fishery. Eighty percent of the lob-
sters are caught within three miles of shore. Since the 19th century, lobsters have been
caught in traps baited with fish or fish remnants. Currently, there are approximately
6,500 lobster license holders. Lobsters are sold to dealers, who have buying stations in
every harbor along the coast, or to one of 17 lobster cooperatives.
The lobster industry is homogenous in terms of equipment and capture technology.
By law, lobsters may be caught only in traps. These are hauled to the surface with a
rope and marked with a buoy with colors registered with the state by a particular fish-
erman. Boats are generally between 30 and 40 feet long and powered with a gasoline or
diesel engine. Boats are equipped with hydraulic trap haulers to bring traps to the sur-
face, a flowing-sea-water tank to store caught lobsters, depth recorder, and radio. Lobster
boats are operated either alone or with a single helper called a sternman.
The lobster industry is highly territorial. Fishermen from each harbor have informal
territories where they place their traps. According to Maine law, a lobster fisherman
needs a state license to fish, but the fisherman also needs to be accepted as a member
of a group fishing from a particular harbor, which I call a harbor gang (Acheson 1988,
2003). Once a fisherman is admitted to such a gang, he (or she) can only place traps in
the traditional territory of that gang. Violation of these boundaries results in sanctions,
either verbal warnings or two half hitches placed on the trap buoy. If the violation con-
tinues, traps may be surreptitiously destroyed. Fishermen from a particular harbor
spend their lives fishing in a small area—perhaps under 100 square miles—with a small
group who know each other well. If there is trouble, everyone has a good idea who is
responsible, and people know who to go to for help. This makes it easy to monitor the
behavior of others and reinforces enforcement of the conservation laws.
Lobster management
From the 1870s when the first conservation laws were passed, lobster management has been
based on size limits and a prohibition on taking lobsters with eggs. These laws protect ju-
venile lobsters and reproductive stock. There is also a law requiring the use of traps, a highly
selective type of gear. Table 2 summarizes important Maine lobster conservation laws.
Table 2 Important maine lobster conservation laws




An Act to protect the Spawn
or egg lobsters
Protect breeding females 1872 Maine House No. 54
Size law Prohibits “taking lobsters less
than 10½ inches” from Oct 15
to April 1




Prohibits taking “lobsters less
than 3¼ inches(carapace
measure)…and any female




503 Current reference, as
amended: Maine Revised
Statutes, Title 12, Part 9,
Chapter 619, Subchapter 2,
section 6431, with revised
measurements
V-notch law “Persons licensed by the
commissioner may hold
egged lobsters for sale to the
commissioner. Before any
egged bearing lobster is
liberated, it must be marked
by the Commissioner or his
agent by cutting a V notch in
the middle flipper of the tail.
Any person taking such a
lobster so marked and
returning it to the water shall
not be deemed to have
violated the foregoing
provision of this section”
Protect egged lobsters and
augment the lobster stock
1948 Laws of Maine Section
123 Current reference, as
amended: Maine Revised
Statutes, Title 12, Part 9,
Chapter 619, Subchapter 2,
section 6436
Traps only “Taking lobsters by means
other than conventional traps
prohibited”
Prevents taking lobsters by
spears, nets or dragging
1961 Maine Revised Statutes,
Title 12, Part 9, Chapter 619,
Subchapter 2, section 6432
Escape vents “It is unlawful to take lobsters
unless the trap is equipped
with unobstructed vents or
gaps in the parlor section
(1 ¾ by 5.75 inches long) or
gaps caused by separating
two lathes”
To permit sub-legal lobsters
to escape from traps
1979 Maine Revised statutes
Title 12, Part 9, Chapter 619,
Subchapter 2, section 6433
Escape panels “All traps must be equipped
with a bio-degradeable panel
designed to release lobsters
from traps which are lobster
while fishing”
To reduce mortality from
ghost (lost) traps
1990 Maine Revised statues,
Title 12, Part 9, Chapter 19,












control over four types of rules
1995 Maine Revised statues,
Title 12, Chapter 19,
Subsection 6466
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ethic”. Many fishermen, perhaps the majority, were involved in illegal activity. Millions
of small lobsters were caught and sold and many were smashed and used for bait.
Gravid females were also sold once the eggs had been cleaned off them (Acheson 1997,
2003). The fishermen who perpetrated these acts were convinced that violations did
little damage to the stock.
The conservation ethic in the Maine lobster fishery had its origin in the 1930s and in-
volved a change in both behavior and attitudes. Our studies, particularly key-informant
interviews of older fishermen, indicate that this change was due, in large part, to the
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because of the Depression, prices were low. Between 1928 and 1932, 40% of the lobster
fishermen went out of business; those who remained had very low incomes (Acheson
1997, 2003). The magnitude of the disaster convinced many that illegal activity was
damaging and that there was a need for both new conservation laws and more stringent
enforcement of the laws. Increasingly, fishermen and others no longer overlooked the
illegal activities of “pirates”. They began to report illegal activity to the wardens, which
made the warden force more efficient. By the end of the 1930s, enforcement had be-
come so effective that the trade in “shorts” to Massachusetts had all but ceased. Piracy
was no longer a profitable game; it had become a criminal activity, and one that most
people considered shameful.
In addition, the growth of the conservation ethic has increased industry support for
conservation legislation. In 1933, a coalition that included fishermen, the commissioner
of the Maine Department of Marine Resources, and powerful legislators was able to
persuade the legislature to pass the “double-gauge” law. This law is a slot measure,
specifying both a minimum-size measure to protect juveniles and a maximum-size
measure to protect reproductive-sized lobsters. (Currently, to be legal, a lobster
must be between 3¼ and 5 inches on the carapace from the eye socket to the end
of the body shell).
After World War II, support for the V-notch program grew dramatically. This law
specifies that fishermen who catch an egged lobster may cut a notch in the tail before
releasing her. The notched lobsters may not be harvested as long as the V-notch lasts.
For decades thousands of fishermen have voluntarily cut notches in the tails of egged
lobsters, resulting in millions of V-notched females—proven breeding stock—in the
Gulf of Maine.
Several conservation measures have been enacted more recently. In 1982, the Maine
Lobstermen’s Association supported a bill to make it mandatory for all traps to be
equipped with escape vents that allow small lobsters to escape. In 1995, the legislature
passed the Lobster Zone Management law, which divides the coast into seven zones
and allows the lobster license holders in each zone to impose three kinds of manage-
ment rules on themselves. Proposed rules become departmental regulations enforced
by the wardens only if two-thirds of the fishermen in a zone vote to approve the rule.
By 1998, all seven zones had approved trap limits, which greatly reduced the number
of traps each fisherman could fish; by 2004, six of the zones had passed limited-entry
rules designed to reduce the number of fishermen over time (Acheson and Taylor
2001). All of these laws were passed by the legislature with the support of powerful
industry factions, and there is little doubt that heavy industry support was necessary
for their passage. Vinal Look, former commissioner of the Department of Marine
Resources, pointed out, “No conservation law has ever been passed if the industry is
against it”. Still it would be wrong to think that passage of these laws was easy. They
were the result of distribution fights between industry factions seeking rules that would
give them some kind of an advantage. Some of these legislative battles were lengthy
and acrimonious (Acheson 2003).
For decades, compliance with the law has been good. A person with a reputation for
taking shorts and destroying the breeding stock will not only have trouble with the war-
dens but the neighbors as well.
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and the future
Groundfishermen and lobster fishermen differ when it comes to their attitudes about the
management and future of their industries. In our 1978 survey, we asked 318 groundfisher-
men, selected at random, “What kinds of regulations would you approve for your section
of the industry?” We received 72 different answers (see Acheson [1984] for detailed results).
The survey revealed four things about the attitudes of groundfishermen. First, many did not
believe many (or even any) regulations were needed. Second, there was no consensus on
what regulations should be devised. Third, there was no support for the types of regula-
tions that the regional council and NMFS produced (e.g., a quota), but substantial support
for rules that the NMFS staff believed were inadequate. Fourth, although many fishermen
recognized that stocks were in difficulty, they doubted the ability of the government and
political system to solve the problems faced by the industry. A follow-up study by the se-
nior author in 2009 reinforced the idea that groundfishermen have a short-term perspec-
tive, and nothing in the institutional structure of the management regime gives them an
incentive to invest in high-quality conservation rules. They focus on staying in business in
the short run and hope stocks will not be unduly damaged by fishing (see Acheson and
Gardner [2011] for details). One summarized their attitudes by saying, “I know we have
done a lot of damage to the stocks. But I need to keep fishing hard. I have bills to pay. I
hope the fish stocks will last. If the fish give out, I will just have to find some other job”.
Our 2009 survey of lobstermen, on the other hand, found that 75% or more of
respondents rated all existing lobster laws as very effective. They were well disposed to-
ward the zone management law, with almost 40% giving the system a positive rating,
versus 26% negative. A sizeable majority of respondents said they favoured the current
trap limits in their zones, and the vast majority favoured abolishing dragging for lobsters,
which they regard as a wasteful practice. These attitudes constitute strong evidence of a
conservation ethic.
Explaning the differences between the groundfishery and the lobster fishery
There are a number of technical, biological, and social and cultural factors that, accord-
ing to rational choice theory, make the groundfish industry less likely to solve its
collective-action problem than the lobster industry.
Technical and biological factors
The species biology and fishing technology present problems for groundfish management.
Groundfishing gear is highly unselective, taking all sizes of fish, including juveniles and
those with eggs. When groundfish are hauled to the surface from any depth, their swim
bladders break and they die; a high percentage of all fish caught come aboard dead. More-
over, of the 15 groundfish species, several can be caught by the same technology, resulting
in a serious by-catch problem. By contrast, lobster traps are highly selective. A lobster trap
can be pulled to the surface, the undersized, oversized, and V-notched lobsters released
overboard, and most these released lobsters will float to the bottom unharmed.
Modeling the evolution of rules
The evolution of rules is connected with a large number of social and cultural factors
that we model. Historically in the lobster industry, the pirate ethic gave way to the
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behavior theory and evolutionary game theory give us tools to better understand what
happened in these industries.
We have developed a model to illuminate what happened in these two fisheries,
building on the theory of adaptive management. Conservation lies at the heart of any
successful management scheme. To present the starkest choice imaginable, consider
just two conservation rules. Conservation rule I stands for the status quo. For the New
England groundfishery, think of this as the traditional overexploitation of the fishery.
Conservation rule II represents a better management scheme—of the sort that has been
sought since the 1970s.
Consider a set of n fishermen. We normalize their payoffs from following conserva-
tion rule I to be zero. By contrast, if every fisherman follows conservation rule II, the
benefit is b and the cost is c. Since conservation rule II represents better management,
we have
b–c > 0 ð1Þ
It pays if every fisherman follows conservation rule II.If things were this simple, then fishermen would adopt conservation rule II and there
would be no downward spiral. This is where the dilemma comes in.
Let x(i) be fisherman i’s strategy, which takes on two values: x(i) = 1 if fisherman i fol-
lows conservation rule II, and x(i) = 0 if i follows conservation rule I. Finally, let X be
the sum of the x(i). This notation suffices to track the strategies employed in the game.
Let u(i) be fisherman i’s payoff function.
u ið Þ ¼ X=nð Þb‐c if x ið Þ ¼ 1
¼ X=nð Þb if x ið Þ ¼ 0 ð2Þ
The idea is that the full benefit b of following conservation rule II is only achieved ifeveryone in the fishery follows that rule. Otherwise, the benefit is proportional to the
number following the rule. If everyone follows conservation rule I, then X = 0 and the
payoff for each fisherman is 0. There are two cases to consider, depending on whether
b/n > c or b/n < c.
When b/n > c, fisherman i has an incentive to follow conservation rule II even if no
one else does. His payoff is (1/n)b – c > 0, which is better than conservation rule I pays.
This inequality applies to every player, and the result is a Nash equilibrium x* of the
game with x*(i) = 1 for every fisherman. The benefit to conservation rule II is so great
that every fisherman adopts it. Unfortunately for the New England groundfishery, this
is not the case that applies.
Now suppose b/n < c. Fisherman i has no incentive to follow conservation rule II if
no one else does, since (1/n)b – c < 0, which he would get from following conservation
rule I.
So there is a Nash equilibrium x* with x*(i) = 0 for all i. Plus, the same algebra applies
to values of x greater than 0. So the Nash equilibrium we have identified is unique. This
is the prisoner’s dilemma the fishermen face: x*(i) = 0 for all I is a strictly dominant
strategy that leads to an inefficient outcome.
It is hard to get out of a prisoner’s dilemma because the payoffs involved make it
rational not to cooperate to produce high-quality conservation rules even though
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2004; Gardner 2003). There are several ways to escape the prisoner’s dilemma. As we
shall see, the lobster industry has been able to solve its dilemma by an unusual means—
changing the culture of the industry (i.e., social preferences).
Integrating the ethnography, the model and rational choice theory
Our model and the literature on evolutionary game theory (Gardner 2003; Hofbauer
and Sigmund 2003; Samuelson 2002) suggest four factors led to the development of
conservation rules: low discount rates, low transaction costs, the extent of cheating,
and historical shocks. We consider these in turn.
The first factor is the discount rate, which reflects people’s assessment of future
gains. If individuals do not gain from the development of norms, they will not support
efforts to generate them (Knight 1992). This means that if effective resource manage-
ment rules are to be established, they must allow those who make the investment in
the resource to benefit from that investment. Axelrod (1984) calls this the “shadow of
the future”. If it is unlikely that resources will be there in the future or if investment in
resources will not bring future benefits, there is little incentive to sacrifice current har-
vests for future rewards. Eric Alden Smith (2003: 421) neatly phrases the dynamics
of this situation: “higher payoffs from cooperative production mean a greater incen-
tive to solve collective-action problems, to ensure any needed coordination, and
counter free riding”. Rational choice theorists have long recognized that a high dis-
count rate lowers the willingness of people to get rules and invest in the preservation of
a resource (Ostrom 1990).
In the groundfishery, catches had been falling for decades; there was a lot of cheating;
and fishermen were quite sure the government would not be able to revive the stocks
due to (in their opinions) flawed science and inept management plans. In addition, the
precarious economic position of fishermen made it imperative they get income now to
pay off mounting debts. All of these factors lower benefits b and raise costs c. Under
these conditions, groundfishermen had an incentive to take the stocks now—what we
call a “goldrush mentality—indicating a high discount-rate strategy. Why sacrifice
present gains when the fishery is in inexorable decline, and neither you nor your chil-
dren will reap the benefit of any sacrifices made? The prisoner’s dilemma facing the
industry has not been solved.
In the lobster industry, the opposite set of conditions exists. Lobster fishermen are
confident of good catches in the future. Most are convinced that the conservation rules
are working and are congruent with the way the ocean works. The amount of illegal
activity is low, and the laws are enforced. Under these conditions, it pays to support
conservation rules.
The second factor is transaction costs which also influence the value of benefits and
costs of developing high-quality conservation rules. Transaction costs measure how
hard it is to reach an agreement (North 1990). Rational choice theorists agree that
characteristics of the community influence transaction costs. In particular, small,
homogenous communities with a long history and sense of community are likely to
exhibit low transaction costs. Members of such communities will be more likely to pro-
vide themselves with rules leading to joint benefits (Agrawal 2002; Elster 1989; Knight
1992; North 1990; Ostrom 1990, 2000a, 2000b; Taylor 1990). Under these circumstances,
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Moreover, since groups are homogenous, a proposed rule will affect everyone in the same
way, thereby reducing conflict.
The groundfish industry has almost none of the community characteristics that
would lower transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing rules. Fishermen are scat-
tered throughout New England and constitute a loose social network. Most do not
know many other people in the industry, and they do not form a community with a
long history. They are heterogeneous, both in terms of gear and of ethnicity. Transaction
costs are high, most evident in the run-up to Amendments 13 and 16.
The lobster industry has low transaction costs. The territorial system makes it pos-
sible for members of harbor gangs to monitor each other, resulting in effective enforce-
ment of the rules. The industry is highly homogenous. Everyone uses traps, which are
fished from similar-sized boats. There are no ethnic differences. Many lobster fisher-
men come from old established families that have lived in the community for many
years and have intermarried. Everyone is known and has a reputation in such commu-
nities. A thick web of network ties reinforces solidarity. These factors have lowered the
costs of getting high-quality rules in the lobster industry. Even here, however, negotiating
conservation rules is costly: it takes time and generates acrimony (Acheson 2003).
Transaction costs are also raised by the governance system put in place. Rational
choice theorists have considerable evidence that effective resource-management rules
are likely to arise if local-level communities have a hand in developing them (Ostrom
2000b). The rules to manage the groundfishery were developed in a top-down process
in which the regional council was pushed in many different directions by the NMFS,
judges, the U.S. Congress, scientists, and conservationists. Progress was stalled for
years by bureaucratic complexity and jurisdictional disputes. Sometimes industry fac-
tions played only a small role, the antithesis of local participation. Fishermen trying
to lobby for better rules have spent enormous amounts of time and effort with only
frustration and anger to show for it. The industry’s response has been to oppose rules
presented by the council or to try to stall their imposition, increasing transaction
costs for all. The rules governing the lobster industry are the result of a more
bottom-up approach in which the industry played a major role (see Acheson 1997
and 2003 for more information on the role of the lobster industry in producing these
conservation laws).
The third factor is the number of people adhering to a rule or violating it at any
given time. Our game theory model indicates that if the population starts out with most
fishermen having a pirate ethic, then evolution will lead to a population with all fisher-
men having that ethic—that is the evolutionary stable strategy. If the population starts
out with most fishermen having a conservation ethic, then evolution will lead to a
population with all fishermen having that ethic. The payoffs increase along the evolu-
tionary path towards a good equilibrium.
This prediction seems to be in accord with historical facts in the lobster industry. In
the 1920s when the pirates were in the majority illegal activity was common. In the
mid-1930s, more fishermen began to report violators and fishermen began to obey the
law in increasing numbers. The number of fishermen joining the conservation effort
swelled as enforcement became more effective and an increasing number of fishermen
became convinced that violations of the law were causing serious harm to the stock. In
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idly as the probability of being apprehended grew.
Boyd and Richerson (2005: 247) note that “when punishers are common, defectors do
badly, but when punishers are rare, defectors do well”. The switch from one strategy to
another can happen quickly as the “evolution of cooperation is strongly affected by the
presence of punishment” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005: 244). Unfortunately no cascade of
groundfishermen support the rules proposed by the regional council. No conservation
rule II rules have been developed that have received widespread industry support.
The fourth factor is the historical events moving people from one equilibrium to
another. Our model and the literature on evolutionary game theory suggest it takes a
major event, a shock to the system, to change the system from one strategy to another.
Key-informant interviews indicate the lobster bust was such a shock. This devastating
event forced many fishermen to see the need for better conservation laws and increased
enforcement. This finding is in accord with work by Libecap (2008) who says that rules
to solve collective-action problems in resource management develop when the damage
to resources is so great that people begin to understand what is happening and political
support for conservation increases to the point where politicians can pass laws.
No such conversion has occurred in the groundfishery despite the record low levels
of fish stocks, the increasingly tightened regulations, and the large number of boats
going out of business. All of the evidence suggests that most groundfishermen know
that stocks have been overfished. Many of those remaining in the industry would like
to do something to conserve stocks, but they are unwilling to invest much given the
history of declining catches in the industry, with all that indicates about illegal activity,
poor science and ineffective rules. Moreover, their financial situation is so desperate
they cannot afford to sacrifice current catches for future gains. Despite what Libecap
(2008) says, great damage to resources does not always lead to increased support for
conservation rules.
Implications for theory and management
Some fisheries are easier to manage than others. Managing lobster is easier due to se-
lective gear, biology and communities with the right traits to develop rules. But there
still had to be effective rules. Although there is little consensus on the conditions under
which such rules are generated (Taylor 1990), it is clear that earlier rational choice the-
orists saw rules as stemming from certain social events and various types of interac-
tions, such as group size, heterogeneity, dependence on the resource, and boundaries
(see Ostrom 2000a, 2000b). The small size and homogeneity of harbor gangs along with
the territorial system certainly play a role in helping develop rules for the lobster indus-
try. But more recent work calls attention to the importance of cultural phenomena in
the process, and the relationship between rules and beliefs. In the framework of
Axelrod (1986) and Ostrom (1990) change is driven by experimentation with new
strategies or policies. New rules and strategies come about when people reject inef-
fective strategies and adopt those they believe will work. Ostrom (2010) stresses that
some of the most effective experiments are those that begin small, and then are ap-
plied to larger problems when people are certain they are effective. It is only after
people have learned which strategies are effective that a change in values, beliefs, and
standard practices follows; this can take considerable time. Adoption of new beliefs
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before others (Ellickson 2001).
In the lobster industry, the conservation ethic developed over time, with changes in
beliefs and new rules reinforcing each other. In the early years of the 20th century,
many lobster fishermen, perhaps the majority, had a piracy ethic. They took large num-
bers of short lobsters and scrubbed the eggs off egg-bearing females because there was
poor enforcement and they assumed their activities had little effect on the resource.
The lobster bust of the 1930s, however, forced large number of fishermen to change
their attitudes about conservation, and only then could effective enforcement of exist-
ing laws and new legislation—the double-gauge law—be developed. Lobster fishermen
did not immediately accept the value of this conservation rule; they needed to be con-
vinced that it produced higher catches. Even when catches began to revive in the late
1930s, there were fishermen who did not believe the increase was due to conservation
efforts (Acheson and Gardner 2010). It is unlikely that lobster fishermen would have
pressed for more conservation legislation had catches stayed low, which would have
made it impossible to claim that the double-gauge rule was working. But catches went
up, convincing increasing numbers of fishermen they understood how the ocean
worked and that additional conservation rules (e.g., the V-notch program and escape
vents) were in their long-term best interest. In addition to new rules, there was also a
change in the subculture of the industry, with altered beliefs about the damage caused
by illegal activity, changed attitudes towards law breakers, and a willingness to enforce
the law (Acheson 2003).
The obverse of the same factors produced groundfish management failure. When
management of the groundfishery began in 1977, the stocks, which were already low,
were further devastated by the invasion of large boats after imposition of the Hague
Line in 1984 and the build up of the fleet fostered by federal loan programs. The un-
selective fishing technology, along with the biology of the fish, led to high mortality on
all fish caught. Many groundfishermen were convinced that the management rules were
costly, unenforceable, ineffective, and based on a false scientific model of how the
ocean works. They responded with opposition, lawsuits, and widespread cheating. This
opposition, combined with bureaucratic complexity and jurisdictional disputes with the
NMFS, caused the council to stall imposing rules until long after they could be effective
(Apollonio and Dykstra 2008). Another block to new rules was industry heterogeneity,
which made consensus virtually impossible. In the groundfishery cheating, ineffective
regulations, factional politics, political opposition, and stock decline followed each
other in an ever more desperate downward spiral. In the groundfishery, failure fed on
failure; in the lobster industry, success fed upon success.
Henrich and Henrich (2007: 66) state that norms come about as a result of “cultural
learning and punishment”. This certainly applies to the development of the conserva-
tion ethic in the lobster industry. Fishermen first had to learn the damage that was be-
ing done by illegal activity and then punish those who were guilty.
Experimentation with new strategies is critical to the success of adaptation. The
Maine legislature has allowed a good deal of experimentation with lobster legislation.
Some laws, such as the minimum-size measure, have been changed repeatedly in re-
sponse to pressure from fishermen and biologists. The Lobster Zone Management Law
has allowed fishermen to develop rules in different areas suited to local conditions. By
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eral laws and allow little flexibility or experimentation.
In game theory, the technical term for the change in cultural values that occurred in
the lobster industry is “social preferences”. These are cases where a player’s payoff no
longer depends just on his or her economic result, but more broadly on the overall out-
come. “The term ‘social preferences’ in game theory refers to the concern (or lack
thereof ) that people have for each other’s welfare. It encompasses a wide variety of
behaviors, including altruism, reciprocity, an interest in equality and justice, and a will-
ingness to punish those who deviate from norms or laws” (Acheson and Gardner
2011: 1015). In the literature there are a growing number of cases where people are far
more cooperative than would be predicted based on games such as the prisoner’s di-
lemma (Camerer 2003; Nowak et al. 1995; Nowak and Sigmund 2005; Sigmund et al.
2002) and are willing to punish defectors (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Joseph Henrich and
colleagues say that “researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent
deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self interest in hundreds of
experiments from around the world” (Henrich et al. 2005: 795). They also show that cul-
ture plays an important role in determining game strategies leading to cooperation
(Henrich 2000; Henrich and Henrich 2007).
Groundfishermen may want to develop better conservation laws, but their power to
do so is limited by the top-down management system. If the institutional framework is
too restrictive, experimentation and learning do not take place. Without experiments
that work, no rule will be embraced by the industry. Elinor Ostrom has pointed out
that top-down policies “frustrate the development of private provision of public goods”,
including rules and the subcultures that give rise to them (Ostrom 2000a: 38).
Some people will argue that the new sector-management rules, which are part of
Amendment 16, will allow groups of groundfishermen to experiment with different
rules in different areas of the Gulf of Maine. Of course it is entirely possible, even
likely, that the NMFS and regional council will side with those groups of fishermen
who do not want area management. Under those conditions CR I-type rules will be
produced and the gold rush mentality will continue. If this occurs, then actions of the
government will have produced exactly what should be avoided—attitudes antithetical
to conservation. This underscores the irony that some of the impetus for the downward
spiral in the groundfishery has been produced by actions of government agencies trying
to conserve the fish. Development of stewardship and a conservation ethic depends on
the right kind of institutional framework. That framework has not existed in groundfish-
governance structure.
What can groundfish management learn from the lobster industry? The success of
lobster management stems from the development of a conservation ethic in which
fishermen have come to see that effective management rules and good enforcement
are in their own best interests. After the radical transformation that occurred in the
1930s when the piracy ethic gave way, the conservation ethic has steadily expanded
as the success of rules was demonstrated in ever-increasing catches. Several factors
played a role in the success of lobster management. One is the selective gear used
in lobstering. Another was rules to protect lobsters in vulnerable parts of their
life cycle (i.e., the size rules and the v-notch practice) (Acheson and Wilson 1996).
These factors augment the size of lobster stocks and catches in the future, lowering
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ment activities.
In addition, lobster fishermen live in small, homogenous towns with a long history,
the type of community that most easily comes to consensus. Industry leaders have also
had success in influencing legislation, helping ensure that the laws have good industry
support, and can be changed if they prove inadequate.
Given this background, the groundfishing industry might be well advised to abolish
the unselective otter trawl; generate rules to protect egged females and the nursery
ground of target species; manage the industry in small, local-level units; and allow fish-
ermen to generate management rules and change them if they prove inadequate. En-
forcement would also have to be strengthened. Such rules should be introduced slowly
and effort should be made to ensure they are effective. None of these measures will
prove viable unless the groundfish stocks improve. If catches do go up, then we might
conceivably see a conservation ethic evolve in the groundfish industry over time.
Endnote
aGroundfish covered by the management plans discussed here are 15 species that
live near the ocean bottom: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus
aeglefinus), pollock (Pollachius virens), yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea), witch
flounder (Glyptocephalus cynoglossus), winter flounder (Pseudopleuronectes americanus),
windowpane flounder (Scophthalmus aquosus), American plaice (Hippoglossoides plates-
soides), Atlantic halibut (Hippoglossus hippoglossus), Acadian redfish (Sebastes fasciatus),
ocean pout (Zoarces americanus), white hake (Urophycis tenuis), silver hake (whiting)
(Merluccius bilinearis), red hake (Urophycis chuss), and offshore hake (Merluccius albidus).
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